Brightsource, Fisker and Solyndra – Soul Crushingly Bad Numbers Make up 17% of Near Record 1Q11 Venture Investment

GreentechMedia and Cleantech Group this quarter reported near record levels of cleantech venture capital investment. Nearly $2.6 Billion in deals.  No, quantitative easing hasn’t made the dollar slide that much yet, the numbers are real – mainly as the solar and transport  deals vintage 2004-07 are getting deep into their capital intensive cycles.  But a near record $2.6 billion, so everybody’s happy, right?

Personally, a quick scan of Greentech Media’s summary of the top deals sent cold shivers up my spine. The deals may be getting done, but are we sure investors are making money?  Let’s take three of the big ones and the only ones where Greentech Media quoted valuation numbers:  BrightSource, Fisker, and Solyndra.  Between the three of them that’s 17% of the announced Q1 deal total by dollars.

BrightSource Energy (Oakland, Calif.) raised a $201 million Round E for its concentrated solar power (CSP) technology and deployment, bringing its total funding to more than $530 million in private equity. That funding is in addition to a federal loan guarantee of $1.3 billion. The investors include Alstom, a French power plant player, as well as the usual suspects — Vantage Point Venture Partners, Alstom, CalSTRS, DFJ, DBL Investors, Chevron Technology Ventures, and BP Technology Ventures, together with new investors with assistance from Advanced Equities.  VentureWire reports that the latest round values the company in excess of $700 million.

Brightsource has been a darling for a long, long time.  It is easily the farthest along, most experienced and most ambitious of the solar thermal developers.  So what about the numbers?   Well it’s announced 2.6 GigaWatts of PPAs with SoCal Edison and PG&E.  And they’ve started construction on the first phases of the 392 MW Ivanpah development in the Mojave desert.  That’s the good news.

Here’s the bad news: $700 mm pre-money valuation + $201 mm in round 5 means only a 1.7x TOTAL valuation for investors on the $530 mm that has gone in.  Or the previous round investors are now in aggregate up 2.1x on their money for a 7 year old company after the 5th equity round is in.  Not sure who, but a few of those rounds got rocked, and not in a good way, or else we just did four wonderfully exciting 15% uptick rounds in a row.  But it gets worse.

This first plant, the one they’re headed IPO on, still hasn’t come on line let alone finished phase I.  DOE has committed $1.37 Billion in debt to it, and NRG $300 mm in equity, with more equity capital needed.  So once completed, the venture investors after their meager 2.1x uptick in the first 7 years, are between 3-8 years in on their venture investments and now own part of a heavily leveraged state of the art $2 Bil+ highest cost in the market power plant throwing off revenues of say $125 mm/year.  Perhaps $140-$150 mm at the high end (estimates have varied on capacity factor and price).  Right sounds almost passable.  But now let’s build the cashflow statement.  Add in Brightsource’s estimated direct labor at $10-$15 mm/year ($400 mm over 30 years from their website), plus maintenance/repairs at 0.5% of assets per year of another $10 mm (and hope to God it can stay that low – that would be a tremendous success in and of itself), then add on debt service on $1.37 billion assuming an only available by government guarantee 30 year amortization at 5%, and we eat another $80-$90 mm per year.  So we’re at $100 to $120 mm in annual costs, and $125 to $140 mm in annual revenues.  And we haven’t included gas, water, or any contribution to overhead, which are all non trivial. And don’t forget we’re building this out in 3 phases over several years.

So after all that, if it works, and if it works well, those investors MAY see a net of $20 mm-$40 mm /year in cashflow from that plant by 2014/2015 or so that they can use to cover plant overhead, fuel bills, the remainder which is then split between them and NRG to cover corporate overhead and then pay taxes on; or they may be losing money every month.  But we’ll make it up in volume, right?


But there is hope:

#1  pray for lots and lots of ITC (30% on the $600 mm in non subsidized capital would shave almost a whole 10% off the total cost!)

#2 pray for an IPO (and think VeraSun, sell fast).

#3 pray for a utility who overpays for the development pipeline

Two good articles with some more history from Greentech Media here and here.


Fisker Automotive (Irvine, California), an electric vehicle maker, raised $150 million at a $600 million pre-money valuation (according to VentureWire), from New Enterprise Associates and Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers. The firm previously raised $350 million in VC, as well as a $528 million loan from the DOE.

Terrific, another high flyer.  Same analysis, this one’s younger, only 4 years old, and only on investment round 4, which is good, since they’ve now apparently got a total valuation of only 1.5x investors money, or 1.7x total uptick for the prior 3 rounds of  investors.  But since they’re only in so far for 1-4 years not 3-8 like in Brightsource, they’re ahead of the game ;).  But once they take down their $528 mm in DOE debt (which this last tranche was supposed to be the matching funds for), they’ll be at a soul crushing 110% Debt/Equity.  Oh, and did I mention that the real way to calculate Debt/Equity assumes equity is net book value?  And since with these startups we’re using contributed capital, once should think of our debt to equity ratios as very very very very artificially low – but I didn’t want to scare you too much.

But look on the bright side:

#1 If they really hit their 15,000 car per year at $95K/car and typical 5%-10% automotive operating margins, they could be at solidly into junk bond land at 4-7x debt to EBIT!  (Assuming of course you believe they build a $1.5 billion/year automotive company with no more cash).  Of course, they apparently have a whole 3,000 orders placed for the c. $95K car, and are currently planning closer to 1,000 shipments for year 1.  Compare that to the Nissan Leaf and Chevy Volt, which cost closer to $30K each.  Chevy has been planning on shipping 10,000 Volts in 2011, and 45,000 in 2012.  Nissan has targeted first year Leaf production at c. 20,000, and apparently had more than that many orders before they started shipping.

#2 pray for an IPO

#3 Buy Nissan stock


Solyndra (Fremont, California), a manufacturer of cylindrical solar PV systems for industrial and commercial rooftops, closed $75 million of a secured credit facility underwritten by existing investors. Solyndra had annual revenues exceeding $140 million in 2010 and has shipped almost 100 megawatts of panels for more than 1,000 installations in 20 countries, according to the CEO.

I’m certainly not the first or only one to cry over Solyndra.  And I’m pretty certain I won’t be the last.

Founded in 2005, with a cool billion in equity venture capital into it now, I believe they were on F series before the IPO was canceled last year? With this $75 mm Q1 deal (in secured debt, of course, their investors are learning) they’ve announced another $250 mm in shareholder loans since the IPO cancellation, and the early round investors have been already been pounded into crumbly little bits.  But it’s worse.

If I followed correctly, the original IPO was to have raised $300 mm, plus pulling down the $535 mm in DOE debt.  Here less than 9 months after that process canceled (could that be right?), they’ve now raised 80% of the cash the IPO was planning, except all in debt, and grown revenues nearly double since starting that process.  My only response to this was OMG.  So they’re at a 26% Debt/Equity Ratio for a money losing company, where debt exceeds revenues by a factor.  Pro Forma for the DOE loan fully drawn they’re at 44%, and something like 6x debt to revenue.  These are crushing numbers for healthy profitable companies.  It gets worse.

Go read their IPO prospectus.  Teasing out who invested how much in each round from each fund, and the size of those investors’ announced funds, plus the number of funds that “crossed-over” and did their follow-ons from a newer fund, and you quickly realize there are several venture funds that literally tapped out on Solyndra, likely either hitting house or contractual maximum commitments to a single deal.  The concentration risk in Solyndra is possibly enough to severely pound multiple fund managers, not just Solyndra.


Please somebody please tell me I’ve got the numbers all wrong.